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This paper presents a dynamic principal-agent analysis of incentive systems for Salmonella control. 
Based on the producer’s performance history in controlling Salmonella, the incentive systems 
analysed determine quality premiums to the producer, testing frequencies for hogs delivered, as well 
as charges to the producer for testing and penalties. Using cost estimates and technical parameters, 
we evaluate two dynamic incentive systems. We also assess the impact of ownership structure on 
performance. The more efficient incentive system economises on testing costs by reducing the 
probability of testing in response to a favourable production history and is preferred under all 
ownership structures. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Often the food safety and quality attributes consumers seek are difficult to verify, especially when 
those attributes are derived from the actions of numerous, spatially dispersed producers. Direct 
monitoring of farm production processes is prohibitively expensive in most cases. Recent advances in 
testing technologies will provide better information at lower cost and in a shorter time, but laboratory 
tests to measure critical attributes can still be quite costly. The inherent riskiness of agricultural 
production further complicates the problem. Even if product quality can be assessed at a reasonable 
cost, it may be difficult to determine whether quality problems are due to lack of care and effort by the 
primary producer or to factors outside his control. A variety of incentive mechanisms for addressing 
these agency problems have been proposed, analysed and implemented. The basic principal-agent 
models used in these studies consider incentives, actions and performance for a single period. This 
paper presents a dynamic analysis of incentive systems for Salmonella control in pork production. The 
paper draws extensively on King, Backus, and van der Gaag (2007), but the reader is encouraged to 
consult that paper for more details. 
 We develop a dynamic principal-agent model that allows for explicit consideration of the 
producer’s performance history in controlling Salmonella. Using cost estimates and technical 
parameters based on Dutch data, we use the model to evaluate two dynamic incentive systems for 
quality assurance. Each system is described by a set of parameters that can take a wide range of 
possible values, and our analysis identifies optimal parameter values for each system. Both systems 
include penalties for delivery of hogs with a high Salmonella prevalence level and both systems rely on 
sampling strategies in testing for product quality. In this way they extend previous work by adding 
consideration of production history. The first system captures the essential features of the system 
currently implemented in Denmark and includes the Danish system as a special case. The second is a 
reasonable alternative to the Danish system that uses production history based random testing to 
economise on testing costs. It includes static systems with and without random testing as special 
cases. We also assess the impact of ownership structure on overall chain performance, considering 
slaughter plant ownership by a producer cooperative and by investors who are not pork producers.  
 
2. Model Description 
The dynamic principal-agent model developed for this study identifies Nash equilibrium incentive 
system parameters and associated farm-level Salmonella control policies for a two- segment supply 
chain that includes producers and a slaughter plant. We consider two of many possible incentive 
system designs, with each design having many possible parameter configurations.  
 We assume there is a homogeneous group of hog producers, each of whom is treated as an 
agent in the model. Each producer delivers a fixed number of hogs each month to a slaughter plant 
that has a Salmonella control program. All producers have identical costs for inputs not related to 
Salmonella control, PC, and receive an identical base price, PH, per hog delivered. They also receive 
a producer quality premium, QPP, per hog delivered that is a reward for participation in the plant’s 
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Salmonella control program. Each month, the producer chooses one package from a finite set of 
Salmonella control measure packages, xt ∈  {x1, x2, …, xm}, with an associated cost, c(xt), that 
increases with the intensity of the control measures. We only consider reversible control measures 
that can differ from one month to another. More effective Salmonella control packages are more 
costly. At slaughter, a sample of the producer’s hogs may be serologically tested for Salmonella 
prevalence, prevt ∈  {0, 10, 20, …, 100}. The cost of testing per hog, TC, may be borne by the 
producer or by the slaughter plant, depending on the structure of the incentive system.  
The probability distribution of prevalence levels is a function of the Salmonella control package 
and is denoted by the discrete probability function h(prevt|xt). If hogs are tested, the test results 
become part of the producer’s production history, which is summarised by one element from a finite 
set of production history indicator levels, Rt ∈  {R1, R2, …, Rn}. The incentive system in place – defined 
by a vector of parameters, α – determines how prevalence test results affect the evolution of the 
production history indicator level, the probability that a producer’s hogs will be tested, and penalties for 
Salmonella prevalence levels that exceed thresholds set by the slaughter plant. 
 Producers are assumed to be risk averse with an infinite planning horizon. Preferences are 
represented by an additively time-separable constant absolute risk aversion utility function, and the 
model does not allow for saving. Producers consider the plant’s incentive system to be exogenously 
determined and fixed. Each period, the producer chooses a Salmonella control package and realises a 
net gain from participation in the Salmonella control programme that is equal to the quality premium 
minus costs for quality control measures and Salmonella testing and, possibly, a penalty for a 
Salmonella prevalence level that exceeds thresholds set by the slaughter plant. The producer’s 
problem is solved by dynamic programming, with the Salmonella control package as the control 
variable and the production history indicator level as the state variable. The optimal solution yields a 
steady state Salmonella control package for each production history indicator state. The solution also 
yields probabilities that the producer will be in each state, expected control and testing costs, and 
expected penalties assessed to the producer. If the certainty equivalent of the net gain from 
participation in the Salmonella control programme falls below zero, the producer will terminate his 
relationship with the slaughter plant and will deliver his hogs to another plant that does not offer a 
producer quality premium because it does not restrict Salmonella prevalence. 
 The manager of the slaughter plant is treated as the principal in this model. He cannot directly 
observe producers’ quality control efforts, but he can influence their behaviour through the design of 
the compensation/testing system. Specifically, he can choose the structure of the incentive system 
and the values of parameters in the vector, α, that determine the producer quality premium, testing 
probabilities, penalties, the incidence of testing costs, and the evolution of production history indicator 
levels. Because it has a Salmonella control programme, the slaughter plant receives an exogenously 
determined quality premium equivalent to QPS per hog from its downstream customers if the plant 
level prevalence of Salmonella in hogs delivered by all producers is less than or equal to an 
exogenously determined threshold, PREV*. The plant receives no premium when the plant level 
prevalence in hogs delivered exceeds PREV*. The plant pays quality premiums to producers and 
Salmonella testing costs not paid for by the producers. The plant also receives penalties assessed to 
producers. Otherwise, the plant’s processing margin per hog is fixed. 
 The manager chooses a compensation/testing system that optimises his relevant performance 
measure, subject to producers’ optimal behaviour under the incentive system and the participation 
constraint that the certainty equivalent of each producer’s expected net gain from participation in the 
Salmonella control programme must be greater than or equal to zero. Note that, under the assumption 
of homogeneous producers, the production history indicator state probability information that is part of 
the optimal solution for the producer model can be used to determine the distribution of Salmonella 
prevalence for all the hogs delivered to the slaughter plant and the expected value of penalties to be 
assessed on the slaughter plant by its customers. 
 The manager’s relevant performance measure depends on the ownership structure for the 
slaughter plant. We consider two structures: ownership by non-producer investors (IOF) and 
ownership by a producer cooperative (COOP). Under the IOF structure, the manager maximises the 
plant’s expected gain from participation in a Salmonella control programme, which is defined as the 
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expected premium received from downstream customers plus expected penalties paid to the plant by 
producers minus producer quality premiums and Salmonella testing costs paid by the plant. Under the 
COOP structure, the manager maximises the certainty equivalent of the representative producer’s net 
gain from participation in the Salmonella control program subject to the constraint that the plant’s 
expected gain from participation in the Salmonella control program is greater than or equal to zero. We 
also consider the case where the manager chooses incentive system parameters to maximise net 
gains from Salmonella control for the entire two-segment chain (CHAIN). In this case, the objective is 
to maximise the plant’s expected quality premium minus control and testing costs. 
 Given the behavioural assumptions in this analysis, along with the assumptions that incentive 
system parameters will be fixed over the entire planning horizon and that the manager will be honest 
in applying the incentive system parameters he chooses under a particular incentive system design 
and ownership structure, the incentive system parameters and the producer’s associated optimal 
Salmonella control policy represent a Nash equilibrium. Given the other party’s optimal response, 
neither the producer nor the manager can be made better off by deviating from their optimal solutions.  
  
2.1 Moving Average System 
 The first of the two compensation/testing systems considered in this analysis – denoted the 
‘moving average’ system – has the structure of the current Danish Salmonella control system. Under 
this system, each producer’s hogs are tested each month, with the per-hog cost of testing, TC, being 
borne by either the producer or the slaughter plant. The producer’s production history indicator level, 
M
tR , is represented by a vector whose two elements are the two most recent prevalence test results. 
The Salmonella prevalence category level for period t, Lt, is based on MAt, a weighted moving average 
of the current and two most recent prevalence test results. Note that MAt is a random variable, since 
the current prevalence level, prevt, is a random variable, with a probability function, h(prevt|xt), that is 
conditional on the control level. This, in turn, makes Lt a random variable. The prevalence penalty per 
hog paid by the producer, pent, is based on the current Salmonella prevalence level. 
  All producers participating in the plant’s Salmonella control programme receive the quality 
premium, QPP. This is chosen by the plant as a parameter of the incentive system and is designated 
M
0α . A final parameter in this system is ]1,0[6 ∈Mα , the share of the testing cost borne by the 
producer. The current return per hog under the moving average system, ),( Mtt
M Rxf , is defined by 
the following expression: 
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Under this system, the producer’s choice of control package, xt, influences the probability distribution 
of current returns not only through control costs but also through its impact on the probability of being 
required to pay a prevalence penalty that is determined by current and prior test results. The current 
control package also influences future returns through its effect on the production history indicator 
level. The producer’s dynamic programming problem under this system can be formally stated as: 
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where E is the expectations operator, δ is the monthly discount factor, and λ is the producer’s constant 
level of absolute risk aversion. The fact that the current prevalence test result, prevt, is a random 
variable known only after the Salmonella control package has been chosen introduces uncertainty into 
this problem.  
 
2.2 Cumulative Experience System 
 Under the second of the two compensation/testing system designs considered in this analysis – 
denoted the “cumulative experience” system – the producer’s production history indicator level, CtR , 
is a scalar defined as the number of consecutive months (up to a maximum of C1α  ∈  {0, 1, 2, …, 24}) 
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he has delivered hogs prior to the current period without having a salmonella prevalence test level 
exceeding the plant’s Salmonella threshold level, PREV*. The probability that the producer’s hogs will 
be tested on delivery, )( CtRt , declines as 
C
tR  increases according to the following relationship: 
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where C2α  is the maximum probability of being tested, C3α  is a testing probability reduction 
parameter, and C4α  is the minimum probability of being tested. The evolution of the production history 
indicator is described by the following expression: 
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where Testt is a binary variable equal to one if the producer’s hogs are tested in period t and zero 
otherwise, and Fail(xt) is a binary variable equal to one if the producer’s hogs are tested in period t and 
have a prevalence test result above the allowable threshold and zero otherwise. CtR 1+  is a random 
variable that depends not only on the control package used by the producer but also on the probability 
of testing determined by the current production history indicator. The probability that the prevalence 
test result will be below the plant’s Salmonella threshold level, s(xt), is calculated for each control 
package by summing values of the prevalence probability function, h(prevt|xt), over prevalence levels 
less than or equal to the Salmonella threshold, PREV*. This incentive system has three additional 
parameters: C0α  is the quality premium per hog paid to producers who participate in the plant’s 
Salmonella control program, C5α  is the size of the penalty per hog for a prevalence test result that 
exceeds the plant’s Salmonella threshold level, and ]1,0[6 ∈Cα  is the share of the expected testing 
cost paid by the producer. The current return per hog under the cumulative reputation system is 
defined by: 
 TCRtxFailTestxcRxf Ct
C
tt
C
t
CC
tt
C )()()(),( 650 ααα −−−=       (5)  
The producer pays his expected testing cost, regardless of whether his hogs are actually tested. As in 
the moving average system, the producer’s choice of a Salmonella control package, xt, influences the 
distribution of current returns not only through control costs but also through its effect on the 
probability of paying a penalty for a prevalence test above the allowable threshold. The current control 
package also influences future returns through its effect on the production history indicator level, which 
affects testing costs and the probability of having one’s hogs tested. The producer’s dynamic 
programming problem can be formally stated as: 
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where E, δ and λ are as defined for the moving average system.  
 The cumulative experience system can provide strong incentives for a producer to use intensive 
Salmonella control measures in order to build a favourable production history. At the same time, a 
producer’s experience under this system is sensitive to uncertainties regarding control measure 
efficacy and the accuracy of testing. 
 
3. Model Parameters and solution Procedures 
Model parameters for this analysis are based on current conditions for hog finishing operations in the 
Netherlands. Only reversible measures are included in the three control packages considered in this 
analysis. These three packages all contain basic control measures. Package 2 adds strict all-in/all-out 
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procedures and separate routes for different suppliers. Package 3 adds acidification of feed and/or 
water, a highly effective but expensive measure. 
 Prevalence probability distributions for the three farm control packages (h(prevt|xt) are elicited 
based on Salmonella expert opinions. These prevalence distributions are used to determine elements 
of the state transition matrices required to solve the producer’s dynamic programming problem. 
 General purpose MATLAB routines developed by Miranda and Fackler (2002) were adapted to 
solve the producer’s stochastic discrete time/discrete state infinite horizon dynamic programming 
problem for a given set of parameters under each of the two incentive systems. The program uses 
policy iteration to identify an optimal steady state control package for each possible production history 
state. The solution procedure also identifies the state transition matrix associated with the optimal 
policy, which can be used to determine a long-run probability for each possible state under the optimal 
policy. This, in turn can be used along with the optimal policy to calculate expected control costs, 
testing costs, penalties, and prevalence levels for a producer operating under the optimal policy.  
 In order to solve the slaughter plant manager’s problem of selecting an optimal set of incentive 
parameters, the producer problem was embedded in a grid search program that systematically 
explored the relevant incentive parameter space. The optimal parameters for the manager problem 
combined with the optimal producer control policy for those parameters, define a Nash equilibrium, 
since both the producer and the slaughter plant are responding optimally the other party’s choices. 
 
4. Results 
 Nash equilibrium incentive system parameters and performance measures for the two incentive 
systems under each of the three ownership structures are calculated using the producer’s optimal 
Salmonella control policies and the associated steady state probabilities for each possible production 
history state. Under the moving average incentive system, Nash equilibrium parameters differ across 
ownership structures. With the exception of the producer quality premium and the producer share of 
testing costs, optimal incentive system parameters are remarkably similar across ownership structures 
under the cumulative experience system. Changes in the producer quality premium and testing cost 
share simply transfer returns between producers and the slaughter plant. Producers pay testing costs 
under IOF ownership, while the plant pays all testing costs under COOP and CHAIN ownership. 
Because there is some uncertainty over testing costs under this system, shifting this uncertainty to the 
risk neutral slaughter company lessens the risk borne by the risk averse producer. In turn, this reduces 
the risk premium in the system and so increases efficiency. The magnitude of the optimal producer 
quality premium exhibits large changes across ownership structures. This premium is a mechanism for 
shifting gains between producers and the slaughter plant without affecting risk. It is low under IOF 
ownership and high under COOP ownership. 
 The expected welfare gains for the cumulative experience system are higher than corresponding 
gains under the moving average system for each of the three ownership structures, and differences in 
gains across ownership structures are very small. The preference for the cumulative experience 
system is due largely to lower testing costs. A random testing regime makes it possible to reduce 
testing costs without sacrificing product quality. Relative rankings of the two systems are insensitive to 
changes in key behavioural assumptions and external conditions, though optimal incentive system 
parameters can be quite sensitive to these changes. Analysis based on this model demonstrates the 
value of considering performance history when producers make repeated deliveries, and this analysis 
yields useful insights into the relative performance of two production history-based incentive systems.  
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Table. Parameters and Performance Measures for Optimal Incentive Systems (λ = 0.10 and dhogd = 50) 
 
Moving Average System Cumulative Experience System 
        
Parameters IOF COOP CHAIN Parameters IOF COOP CHAIN 
M
0α  – Producer quality premium 2.55 4.25 3.40 C0α  – Producer quality premium 2.00 4.25 3.60 
M
1α  – Weight on current test result 0.33 0.40 0.30 C1α  – Maximum CtR  24 24 24 
M
2α  –Level 1 upper prevalence bound 15 25 10 C2α  – Maximum testing probability 0.98 1.00 1.00 
M
3α  –Level 2 upper prevalence bound 20 35 45 C3α  – Testing probability reduction 0.11 0.11 0.11 
M
4α  – Level 2 penalty 0.20 1.15 2.20 C4α  – Minimum testing probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 
M
5α  – Level 3 penalty 2.70 10.05 3.40 C5α  – Producer penalty 4.20 4.15 4.10 
M
6α – Producer share of testing cost 1.00 0.00 0.00 C6α  – Producer share of testing cost 1.00 0.00 0.00 
        
Performance Measures    Performance Measures    
Expected prevalence 15.691 15.88 15.91 Expected prevalence 15.89 15.78 15.78 
     
- producer quality premium 2.550 4.250 3.400 - producer quality premium 2.000 4.250 3.000 
- expected control cost 1.759 1.739 1.735 - expected control cost 1.738 1.749 1.749 
- expected testing cost 0.100 0.000 0.000 - expected testing cost 0.025 0.000 0.000 
- expected penalty to plant 0.602 0.220 1.273 - expected penalty to plant 0.133 0.135 0.133 
- expected total cost 2.460 1.959  3.008 - expected total cost  1.896  1.884 1.882 
- expected monetary gain 0.090 2.291 0.392 - expected monetary gain 0.104 2.367 1.720 
Farmer certainty equivalent of gain 0.000 2.137 0.329 Farmer certainty equivalent of gain 0.003 2.267 1.620 
- slaughter plant price premium 4.250 4.250 4.250 - slaughter plant price premium 4.250 4.250 4.250 
- quality premium paid to producers 2.550 4.250 3.400 - quality premium paid to producers 2.000 4.250 3.600 
- expected penalty from producers 0.602 0.220 1.273 - expected penalty from producers 0.133 0.135 0.133 
- expected testing cost 0.000 0.100 0.100 - expected testing cost 0.000 0.026 0.026 
- expected slaughter penalty 0.095 0.120 0.126 - expected slaughter penalty 0.122 0.107 0.107 
Expected monetary slaughter gain 2.206 0.000 1.897 Expected monetary slaughter gain 2.261 0.002 0.650 
Expected welfare gain for the chain 2.207 2.138 2.226 Expected welfare gain for the chain 2.264 2.269 2.269 
 
